US 12,149,461 B2
Apparatus and method for protecting against victim masquerade attack in remote interference management
Hassan Ghozlan, Hillsboro, OR (US); Dawei Ying, Hillsboro, OR (US); Qian Li, Beaverton, OR (US); and Geng Wu, Portland, OR (US)
Assigned to Apple Inc., Cupertino, CA (US)
Appl. No. 17/430,619
Filed by Apple Inc., Cupertino, CA (US)
PCT Filed Feb. 17, 2020, PCT No. PCT/US2020/018530
§ 371(c)(1), (2) Date Aug. 12, 2021,
PCT Pub. No. WO2020/168333, PCT Pub. Date Aug. 20, 2020.
Claims priority of provisional application 62/806,246, filed on Feb. 15, 2019.
Prior Publication US 2022/0109536 A1, Apr. 7, 2022
Int. Cl. H04L 5/00 (2006.01); H04W 12/122 (2021.01)
CPC H04L 5/0032 (2013.01) [H04L 5/0048 (2013.01); H04L 5/0053 (2013.01); H04W 12/122 (2021.01)] 12 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A central entity for verifying legitimate victim-aggressor pairs in remote interference management operation, the central entity comprising:
radio front end circuitry; and
processor circuitry, coupled to the radio front end circuitry, the processor circuitry configured to:
detect a first event report from a victim base station, wherein the first event report is based on the victim base station detecting a presence of an atmospheric duct, and wherein the first event report includes an ID of the victim base station;
trigger, using the radio front end circuitry and in response to the first event report, an aggressor base station to begin monitoring for transmission of a victim reference signal sent in response to detecting the presence of the atmospheric duct;
detect a second event report from the aggressor base station, the second event report being sent in response to detecting the victim reference signal; and
upon receipt of the second event report, verify that the victim base station and the aggressor base station are legitimate based on the first event report and the second event report.