US 12,445,489 B2
MAC address cloning attack detection for V2X devices
Soumya Das, San Diego, CA (US); Gabi Sarkis, San Diego, CA (US); Mohammad Nekoui, San Diego, CA (US); and Jonathan Petit, Wenham, MA (US)
Assigned to QUALCOMM Incorporated, San Diego, CA (US)
Filed by QUALCOMM Incorporated, San Diego, CA (US)
Filed on May 11, 2023, as Appl. No. 18/316,025.
Prior Publication US 2024/0380782 A1, Nov. 14, 2024
Int. Cl. H04L 29/06 (2006.01); G06F 1/20 (2006.01); H04L 9/40 (2022.01)
CPC H04L 63/1483 (2013.01) [G06F 1/206 (2013.01)] 29 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. An apparatus for wireless communication at a first vehicle-to- everything (V2X) device, comprising:
a memory; and
a processor coupled to the memory and, based on information stored in the memory, the processor is configured to:
obtain a message comprising a medium access control (MAC) header, a layer 1 (L1) source identifier (ID), and an L1 destination ID;
decode the MAC header to produce a layer 2 (L2) source ID associated with the message based on at least one of (1) the L1 destination ID of the message matching a first number of bits of an L2 source ID of the first V2X device or (2) the L1 source ID of the message matching a second number of bits of the L2 source ID of the first V2X device, wherein to decode the MAC header, the processor is configured to decode the MAC header further based on the L1 destination ID of the message matching a third number of bits of a provider service ID (PSID) associated with the first V2X device.; and
output an indication of a MAC cloning attack based on the L2 source ID of the message matching the L2 source ID of the first V2X device.