US 12,081,561 B2
Detecting clock synchronization attacks in time sensitive networks using key performance indicators
Javier Perez-Ramirez, North Plains, OR (US); Mikhail Galeev, Beaverton, OR (US); Marcio Juliato, Portland, OR (US); Christopher Gutierrez, Hillsboro, OR (US); Dave Cavalcanti, Portland, OR (US); Manoj Sastry, Portland, OR (US); Kevin Stanton, Hillsboro, OR (US); and Vuk Lesi, Cornelius, OR (US)
Assigned to INTEL CORPORATION, Santa Clara, CA (US)
Filed by Intel Corporation, Santa Clara, CA (US)
Filed on Sep. 23, 2021, as Appl. No. 17/483,723.
Prior Publication US 2022/0014532 A1, Jan. 13, 2022
Int. Cl. H04L 9/40 (2022.01)
CPC H04L 63/1416 (2013.01) [H04L 63/1425 (2013.01)] 24 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A computing-implemented method, comprising:
establishing a data stream between a first device and a second device, the data stream comprising a plurality of switching nodes;
providing an indication of a protected transmission window to each of the plurality of switching nodes;
receiving, from one of the plurality of switching nodes, a key performance indicator (KPI) relative to the timing of the protected transmission window for the one of the plurality of switching nodes, wherein the KPI represents a delay time or a time buffer of a packet from the data stream within the protected transmission window; and
determining whether the one of the plurality of switching nodes is subject to a timing attack based on the KPI.