US 12,388,629 B2
Messageless secure multi-party computations with passive and active adversaries
Miguel De Vega Rodrigo, Santa Cruz de Tenerife (ES)
Assigned to SEDICII INNOVATIONS LTD., (IE)
Filed by SEDICII INNOVATIONS LTD., Waterford (IE)
Filed on Jun. 30, 2023, as Appl. No. 18/217,048.
Claims priority of provisional application 63/357,815, filed on Jul. 1, 2022.
Prior Publication US 2024/0007273 A1, Jan. 4, 2024
Int. Cl. G06F 21/00 (2013.01); H04L 9/08 (2006.01)
CPC H04L 9/085 (2013.01) [H04L 2209/46 (2013.01)] 25 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A computer-implemented method, carried out between a plurality of D dealer nodes and N computing nodes, for use in calculating the result of an arithmetic function ƒ which can be expressed as the addition of A groups of multiplications of a set S of private input secrets {s0, s1, . . . , sS-1} such that:

OG Complex Work Unit Math
where each group of multiplications ma, a∈{0, 1, . . . , A−1} is the product of Ma secrets of said set S of private input secrets:

OG Complex Work Unit Math
and the subindices ia,m for α∈{0, 1, . . . , A−1}, m∈{0, 1, . . . , Ma−1} identify private input secrets from the set of S secrets, and where the S secrets are selected from integers, real numbers or complex numbers, and each secret sia,m is known to one of said dealer nodes, wherein the method comprises:
(a) providing each computing node n, n∈{0, 1, . . . , N−1}, with a respective set of shares [αa,0]n, [αa,1]n, . . . , [αa,L-1]n, for every addition a∈{0, . . . , A−1} where L is a number chosen such that L>Ma, ∀a∈{0, 1, . . . , A−1} and L>D, and such that:
(i) the set of all the l-th shares [αa,l]n, l∈{0, . . . L−1}, from the N computing nodes together represent shares of a degree-T polynomial that hide a respective secret exponent blinding factor αa,l at a certain abscissa such as x=0, with N≥T+1; and
(ii) the set of exponent blinding factors αa,0, αa,1, . . . , αa,L-1 for a given addition a are all elements of the multiplicative group (Z/pZ)x of integers modulo a prime number p;
(b) providing each computing node n, n∈{0, 1, . . . , N−1}, with a respective set of shares [ρ−λa]n, where:
(i) ρ is a public generator from the multiplicative group (Z/pZ)x of integers modulo p;
(ii) λa is a secret exponent which satisfies

OG Complex Work Unit Math
(iii) the set of all the shares [ρ−λa]n from the N computing nodes together represent shares of a degree-T polynomial that hide the secret value ρ−λ at a certain abscissa such as x=0;
(c) for each addition a comprising Ma multiplications, providing each of the computing nodes with the same partition sets Pa,0, Pa,1, Pa,Ma-1 of the indexing set {0, 1, . . . , L−1} such that all partition sets are disjoint and non-empty;
(d) each computing node computing, for each addition a, a set of shares [λa,0]n, [λa,1]n, . . . , [λa,Ma-1]n according to:

OG Complex Work Unit Math
for m∈{0, . . . , Ma−1}, wherein for a given addition a and multiplication m the set of the shares [λa,m]n for n∈{0, 1, . . . , N−1} together represent shares of a degree-T polynomial that hide the secret dealer blinding factor λa,m at a certain abscissa such as x=0;
(e) each computing node n sending the respective share [λa,m]n for a∈{0, 1, . . . , A−1}, m∈{0, 1, . . . , Ma−1}, to the respective dealer node contributing the secret sia,m to the computation;
(f) each dealer node reconstructing, for each secret sia,m which it contributes to the computation, the corresponding dealer blinding factor λa,m;
(g) each dealer node sending, for each secret sia,m which it contributes to the computation, a particle va,m to each of the computing nodes wherein:
va,m=sia,m·ρλa,m
(h) each computing node calculating, for each addition a∈{0, 1, . . . , A−1}, a share [ra]n from a degree-T polynomial ra(x) where:

OG Complex Work Unit Math
(i) each computing node calculating a result share [r]n from a degree-T polynomial r(x) where:

OG Complex Work Unit Math
(j) each computing node sending to one or more result node(s) their result share [r]n whereby the result node(s) may reconstruct the evaluation r(0) of polynomial r(x) from the received result shares [r]n, said evaluation r(0) being equal to the result of said arithmetic function ƒ.