US 12,388,625 B2
Techniques for secure data exchanges
Philippe Martin, San Jose, CA (US); Fahimeh Rezaei, Mountain View, CA (US); Marc Kekicheff, Foster City, CA (US); and Eric Le Saint, Los Altos, CA (US)
Assigned to Visa International Service Association, San Francisco, CA (US)
Appl. No. 17/631,357
Filed by Visa International Service Association, San Francisco, CA (US)
PCT Filed Jul. 31, 2020, PCT No. PCT/US2020/044631
§ 371(c)(1), (2) Date Jan. 28, 2022,
PCT Pub. No. WO2021/022221, PCT Pub. Date Feb. 4, 2021.
Claims priority of provisional application 62/881,231, filed on Jul. 31, 2019.
Prior Publication US 2022/0329415 A1, Oct. 13, 2022
Int. Cl. H04L 9/08 (2006.01)
CPC H04L 9/0825 (2013.01) 19 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A method, comprising:
identifying, by a protocol management computer, presence of a reader device utilizing a near field communications channel;
obtaining, by the protocol management computer from a remote server computer, a first initialization key associated with the reader device, wherein a second initialization key corresponding to the first initialization key was previously stored at the reader device during a manufacturing process of the reader device, the first initialization key and the second initialization key being separate instances of a symmetric key;
transmitting, by the protocol management computer to the reader device, a first encrypted message and a first initialization vector, the first encrypted message being encrypted using the symmetric key and the first initialization vector;
receiving, by the protocol management computer via the near field communications channel from the reader device, a second encrypted message comprising a first public key associated with the reader device, the second encrypted message being encrypted using a second initialization vector that is generated by the reader device using the first initialization vector; and
transmitting, by the protocol management computer via the near field communications channel to the reader device, a third encrypted message comprising a second public key associated with the protocol management computer, wherein the third encrypted message is encrypted utilizing a third initialization vector that is generated by the protocol management computer using the second initialization vector that was previously generated using the first initialization vector.