US 12,336,009 B2
Anonymous collection of directional transmissions
Eran Shpak, Tel Aviv (IL)
Assigned to Deeyook Location Technologies Ltd, Tel-Aviv (IL)
Filed by Deeyook Location Technologies Ltd., Tel Aviv (IL)
Filed on Jul. 18, 2022, as Appl. No. 17/866,620.
Application 17/866,620 is a continuation in part of application No. PCT/IB2020/060801, filed on Nov. 17, 2020.
Application PCT/IB2020/060801 is a continuation of application No. 16/783,196, filed on Feb. 6, 2020, granted, now 11,240,846, issued on Feb. 1, 2022.
Prior Publication US 2022/0361244 A1, Nov. 10, 2022
Int. Cl. H04W 74/0816 (2024.01); H04L 5/00 (2006.01); H04L 27/26 (2006.01); H04W 4/029 (2018.01); H04W 64/00 (2009.01); H04W 84/12 (2009.01); H04L 101/622 (2022.01)
CPC H04W 74/0816 (2013.01) [H04L 5/0007 (2013.01); H04L 27/2607 (2013.01); H04W 4/029 (2018.02); H04W 64/003 (2013.01); H04W 84/12 (2013.01); H04L 2101/622 (2022.05)] 30 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A method for communication, comprising:
detecting, at a first station in a wireless network, a beacon transmitted over the wireless network by a second station having multiple antennas;
in response to the beacon, transmitting a request-to-send (RTS) frame over the wireless network using a multi-carrier modulation scheme from the first station to the second station;
receiving at the first station a clear-to-send (CTS) frame transmitted over the wireless network, in response to the RTS frame, by the second station via the multiple antennas using the multi-carrier modulation scheme; and
estimating a property of the first station based on the received CTS frame,
wherein detecting the beacon comprises extracting a medium access control (MAC) address of the second station from the beacon, and wherein transmitting the RTS frame comprises inserting the MAC address as a receiver address (RA) in the RTS frame, and
wherein transmitting the RTS frame comprises generating a spoofed address that encodes the MAC address of the second station, and inserting the spoofed address as a transmitter address (TA) in the RTS frame, thereby causing the second station to insert the spoofed address as the RA in the CTS frame.