US 12,248,568 B2
Systems and methods for disparate quantum computing threat detection
Ramanathan Ramanathan, Bellevue, WA (US); Andrew J. Garner, IV, State Road, NC (US); Abhijit Rao, Irvine, CA (US); Pierre Arbajian, Matthews, NC (US); Michael Erik Meinholz, Charlotte, NC (US); Omar B. Khan, Richmond, VA (US); and Ramesh Yarlagadda, Charlotte, NC (US)
Assigned to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., San Francisco, CA (US)
Filed by Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., San Francisco, CA (US)
Filed on Jan. 16, 2024, as Appl. No. 18/414,115.
Application 18/414,115 is a continuation of application No. 17/659,825, filed on Apr. 19, 2022, granted, now 11,914,707.
Application 17/659,825 is a continuation of application No. 16/745,936, filed on Jan. 17, 2020, granted, now 11,334,667, issued on May 17, 2022.
Prior Publication US 2024/0411874 A1, Dec. 12, 2024
Int. Cl. G06F 21/55 (2013.01); G06N 10/00 (2022.01); H04L 9/08 (2006.01); H04L 9/30 (2006.01)
CPC G06F 21/554 (2013.01) [G06N 10/00 (2019.01); H04L 9/0861 (2013.01); H04L 9/30 (2013.01); G06F 2221/034 (2013.01)] 20 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A system for quantum computing (QC) detection, the system comprising:
QC detection data generation circuitry configured to:
generate a set of QC detection data;
cryptographic circuitry configured to:
distort the set of QC detection data via a first PQC cryptographic technique,
generate a pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys comprising a public cryptographic key and a private cryptographic key via a second PQC cryptographic technique,
generate encrypted QC detection data from the distorted set of QC detection data based on the pair of asymmetric cryptographic keys, and
destroy the private cryptographic key; and
data monitoring circuitry configured to:
monitor a set of data environments for electronic information related to the encrypted QC detection data.