CPC G06F 21/32 (2013.01) [G06F 21/602 (2013.01); G06F 21/6245 (2013.01); G06V 40/168 (2022.01); G06V 40/172 (2022.01); G06V 40/50 (2022.01); H04L 9/008 (2013.01); H04L 9/3231 (2013.01)] | 20 Claims |
1. A method for HE (homomorphic encrypted), privacy BGH(k)-protective, dynamically expandable, distributed resource biometrics identification and verification processing, with exception based local cleartext failover comprising:
an interface session logic of a biometric capture, EP HE ECDS (biometric capture, exception protective HE encryption and distribution) unit storing a correspondence (TID(k)↔BGH(k)), between captured biographic information BGH(k) and a temporary identifier TID(k);
the biometric capture, EP HE ECDS unit appending TID(k) to communications from the unit to a third-party computer resource of a kth user; k is a natural number;
the third-party computer resource appending TID(k) to processing results the third-party computer resource communicates back to the biometric capture, EP HE ECDS unit;
the biometric capture, EP HE ECDS unit including a biometric capture device; the biometric capture device capturing one or more types of biometric information BM(k) of the kth user;
the biometric capture, EP HE ECDS unit including biometric feature vector logic; the biometric feature vector (FV) logic computing from the biometric information BM(k), a biometric feature vector FV(BM(k));
the biometric capture, EP HE ECDS unit including HE encrypting logic; the HE encrypting logic HE encrypting FV(BM(k)) to generate HE{FV(BM(k))}; and
uploading the HE feature vector encrypted biometric information HE{FV(BM(k))} to a biometric reference gallery holding biometric information in memory;
generating HE encryption of a feature vector of a first user's biometric information (FV(BM(k1);
generating HE encryption of a feature vector of a second user's biometric information FV(BM(k2));
wherein HE encryption of the feature vector of a first user's biometric information is identical to the HE encryption of the feature vector of a second user's biometric information, irrespective of the two feature vectors having different values; and
detecting a collision wherein the first user feature vector and the second user feature vector, k1 not being equal to k2, and FV(BM(k1)) not being equal to FV(BM(k2)), there is an instance of HE{FV(BM(k1))} being identical to HE{FV(BM(k2))}.
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