US 12,233,273 B2
Permission-based control of interfacing components with a medical device
Steven E. Sjoquist, Lynnwood, WA (US); David P. Finch, Bothell, WA (US); Erick M. Roane, Kirkland, WA (US); Zoie R. Engman, Kirkland, WA (US); Jonathan P. Niegowski, Issaquah, WA (US); Dusan Beblavy, Bidovce (SK); Martin Pribula, Kosice (SK); Peter Curila, Kosice (SK); and Martin Kolesár, Spisska Nova Ves (SK)
Assigned to West Affum Holdings DAC, Dublin (IE)
Filed by West Affum Holdings DAC, Dublin (IE)
Filed on Feb. 20, 2024, as Appl. No. 18/582,388.
Application 17/738,385 is a division of application No. 16/396,628, filed on Apr. 26, 2019, granted, now 11,324,960, issued on May 10, 2022.
Application 18/582,388 is a continuation of application No. 17/738,385, filed on May 6, 2022, granted, now 11,931,591.
Claims priority of provisional application 62/663,131, filed on Apr. 26, 2018.
Prior Publication US 2024/0189611 A1, Jun. 13, 2024
This patent is subject to a terminal disclaimer.
Int. Cl. H04L 9/40 (2022.01); A61B 5/024 (2006.01); A61N 1/04 (2006.01); A61N 1/39 (2006.01); G06F 21/33 (2013.01); H04L 9/32 (2006.01); A61B 5/00 (2006.01); A61B 5/361 (2021.01); A61B 5/363 (2021.01); A61N 1/372 (2006.01)
CPC A61N 1/3904 (2017.08) [A61B 5/02438 (2013.01); A61N 1/046 (2013.01); A61N 1/0484 (2013.01); A61N 1/3987 (2013.01); A61N 1/3993 (2013.01); G06F 21/33 (2013.01); H04L 9/3268 (2013.01); H04L 63/0823 (2013.01); A61B 5/361 (2021.01); A61B 5/363 (2021.01); A61B 5/6805 (2013.01); A61B 5/74 (2013.01); A61N 1/37258 (2013.01); A61N 1/3925 (2013.01)] 20 Claims
OG exemplary drawing
 
1. A wearable cardiac monitoring system, comprising:
a wearable cardiac monitoring device (WMD);
a processor,
a discharge circuit configured to discharge a stored electrical charge through a body of a patient, the discharge circuit in communication with the processor; and
a memory in communication with the processor, the memory including a certificate store in which is stored a security certificate, the security certificate including:
information that identifies a trusted component with which the WMD has secure communication,
a public key that enables encryption of data intended to be delivered to the trusted component,
at least one data field associated with at least one function that the trusted component can perform in connection with the WMD, and
a signature that authenticates the security certificate as being attested to by a Certificate Authority;
wherein the processor is programmed to deny communication with the trusted component when the security certificate is not attested to by the Certificate Authority.